Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that exaggeratedly had news may propagate in the marketplace of ideas. Three studies investigate whether people prefer to pass along pieces of bad news or good news that are equated for "surprisingness." People typically prefer to pass along central rather than extreme information (i.e., news that is less surprising rather than more surprising). However, when confronted with extreme information, the results support a preference for congruence, that is, people prefer to pass along news that is congruent with the emotional valence of the domain in question. This means that in emotionally negative domains, contrary to some theoretical predictions, people are willing to pass along bad news even when it is exaggeratedly bad. At the same time, however, people transmit exaggeratedly good news in emotion. ally positive domains. The general discussion indicates how these results may inform research on word of mouth for consumer products and social relations in organizations.
Homeless advocates have estimated 2 million to 3 million people have been homeless at some time during the previous year. In March 1990 the Census Bureau sent 15,000 census takers out one night to count the homeless. They found 230,000. Crossen, 1994 This paper would not have been possible without the active collaboration of David Farnum in the design and administration of Studies 1 and 2, and of Diane Westerfield on the design and administration of Study 3. I thank participants in workshops at the University of Chicago and the Wharton School for comments on earlier drafts. I also thank John Skowronski and an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Chip Heath, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th St., Chicago, IL 60637-1511.
"Parents today spend 40 percent less time with their children than did parents in 1965." [These numbers] quickly became conventional wisdom, cited by officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations. They were picked up more than 50 times in articles and opinion pieces. . . They were embraced in congressional hearings, think-tank reports and books about the plight ofAmerica's children. . . The only problem is that the numbers were wrong. There is no compelling evidence that kids today receive less attention from their parents than kids did in 1965.
U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1996 In the night between the 11th and 12th October 1737 there happened a furious hurricane at the mouth of the Ganges. There was at the same time a violent earthquake, which threw down a great many houses along the riverside. . . . It is computed that 20,000 ships, barks, sloops, boats, canoes, etc. have been cast away . . . 300,000 souls are said to have perished! Oldham's Catalogue of Indian Earthquakes, 1883, cited in Discover, September 1994 On the basis of the account above, the 1737 Calcutta earthquake is considered the third most deadly quake in history. However, it probably shouldn't be, according to Roger Bilham, a seismologist at the University of Colorado, because it probably never happened. "If there was a quake in Calcutta that year, Bilham says, it was at most a tremor" (Discover, September 1994) . According to Bilham, the earthquake is described only by French and British newspapers in stories that are dated months after the ostensible occurrence. The firsthand accounts that could be located, for example, the records of the East India Company, describe a storm on that night, one of the violent cyclones that plague the Bay of Bengal, but not a quake. "According to these reports, Bilham says, it was the hurricaneforce winds and floodwater produced by the storm that cast away ships and washed away buildings-and dispatched not 300,000 but some 3,000 unfortunate souls" (p. 13). The figure of 300,000 deaths is particularly implausible because the entire population of Calcutta was certainly less than that number-as low as 20,000 by one contemporary account.
In an attempt at self-absolution, the media frequently debunks implausible facts and figures like those in the epigraphs (many of which were originally communicated by the media). Examples like these seem to indicate that bad news often spreads furiously, even when it is so exaggerated that it leads people to hold an overly pessimistic view of the world.
It is easy to picture why crusaders against child abduction or homelessness might pass along extreme or distorted figures. However, there seem to be few strategic incentives for British and French newspapers to pass along distorted news about a Calcutta earthquake that never was. Is the tendency to pass along exaggerated facts and descriptions simply explained by crusaders' desire to exhort and persuade or is it shared by disinterested observers as well?
From a theoretical perspective, these examples are particularly striking because they seem to violate a well-documented tendency for people to prefer to believe that the world has good things in store for them (Taylor & Brown, 1988) . Research on "positive illusions" documents that individuals tend to overestimate their control or mastery over their environment and predict overly optimistic outcomes for their future. For example, people think that they will be more likely than the average person to earn a good salary and have a gifted child (Weinstein, 1980) and less likely to experience marital problems or suffer a serious disease (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986) . From this viewpoint, it is surprising that the news in the epigraphs is so exaggeratedly bad. In passing such news along, people seem willing to believe surprisingly negative things about the social and natural environment: that homelessness and child abductions are rampant and that natural disasters randomly kill not just thousands, but hundreds of thousands.
This paper explores this apparent preference for bad news. The experiments in this paper offer at least two advantages in this effort. First, in the natural environment it is typically difficult to measure the extremity of a given piece of news. In hindsight, and with the benefit of a proper study, we might conclude that the claim that "50,000 children are abducted by strangers each year" is too extreme. However, even though the figure is surprising, it may be within the realm of plausibility for most people. While people may pass along extreme information if they think it is true, will they pass along extreme information that is recognizably extreme? By allowing us to create stimuli, the current studies allow us to manipulate extremity precisely.
Second, the experiments allow us to ensure that extreme news is difficult to believe. In natural environments, extreme pieces of news are less likely to be true. However, some of the examples in the introduction partially uncouple the relationship between extremity and believability because the source of the news is highly credible (e.g., a Senator or a newspaper).
1 When people receive news from a highly credible source, they may believe the news even when it is extreme. In the current experiments, I want to understand whether people will pass along extremely good or bad news despite the fact that such extreme news is less likely to be accurate. Thus, I preserve the extremity ofthe extreme information by ensuring that the source of the information is not unduly credible. In the studies below, people receive their good and bad news from acquaintances in casual conversation. Finally, the natural environment does not often allow "bad news" to compete with "good news" that is equally believable. In the epigraphs, perhaps bad news propogated because the natural environment forced exaggeratedly bad news to be more available or salient than good news. Does the environment simply thrust bad news upon people, or do people really prefer to consume and transmit bad news? In the last two studies in this paper, a within-subjects design allows us to examine what happens when bad news competes with equally plausible good news.
To summarize, the design of the current studies allows us to investigate individual preferences for passing along pieces of good or bad news that are equally extreme and equally likely to be untrue. Understanding individual preferences about good and bad news may help us think about what kinds of information might propagate in social interactions. The Discussion section returns to this issue by considering some social situations that might be illuminated by understanding people's preferences for good or bad news, for example, the content of word of mouth for consumer products and the content of gossip in organizations. If people prefer to pass along certain kinds of exaggerated news, then natural social interaction may disseminate information in a way that might lead to distortions like those documented in the epigraphs.
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS: EXTREMITY AND VALENCE OF NEWS
In the studies below, people receive various pieces of news from an acquaintance in casual conversation and then indicate whether they would be likely to pass along the news "as true" in a future conversation. The dependent variable thus collapses across at least two different processes. First, an individual must be persuaded by the news and believe it to be true. Second, he or she must be willing to pass it along to another person.
Each of these processes raises many interesting questions. For example, it would be interesting to ask what kinds of news people chose to consume independent oftheir likelihood ofbelieving it or oftransmitting it to others. People may enjoy gossip or stories of alien abductions even if they do not believe them or pass them along.
2 In this paper, I focus on transmission intentions. Because a piece of news must overcome a number of hurdles before it is transmitted as true, the current studies provide a reasonably stringent test of what kinds of news might survive the transmission process, and thus they better indicate how the information in social interaction might become distorted. It is helpful to distinguish two dimensions of news: (1) the valence of the news, whether the news is "good" or "bad"; and (2) the extremity of the news, how good or bad the news is. Forboth dimensions, it is possible to generate two plausible (but opposite) hypotheses about the kind of information people will transmit in social situations.
First, consider the extremity of news. The first plausible hypothesis, the centrality hypothesis, posits that people will transmit moderate information over more extreme information (the top graph in Fig. 1 ). There are at least two reasons for this. First, transmitters are less likely to believe extreme information. Social Judgment Theory argues that people's attitudes are characterized by a latitude of acceptance that contains their most preferred position and the range of other opinions that they find acceptable (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 363-382) . Extreme news may fall outside transmitters' latitude of acceptance. Thus, transmitters may be less likely to believe extreme information and to pass it along as true. Transmitters may be especially sensitive to the truthfulness of information because of their responsibilities to their conversation partners. Conversational norms require people to make truthful contributions (Grice, 1975) . Second, transmitters may pass along central information because they are concerned about what receivers think ofthem. Even if extreme information falls within their latitude of acceptance, if transmitters believe that others will think the information is too extreme, they may not transmit it because they want to avoid losing credibility (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) .
Although there are strong reasons to believe the centrality hypothesis, there are also reasons to believe 2 Also by asking people whether they would pass along the information as true, I avoid documenting situations where people tell tall tales or tell stories with a wink and a nudge. These situations are also interesting, especially if listeners do not always catch the winks and sometimes believe that the tall tales are true.
Hypotheses about extremity
The centrality hypothesis that the opposite might be true. The extremity hypothesis posits that people will transmit more extreme information over more moderate information (the second graph in Fig. 1 ). This pattern would result if people value "surprisingness" or think that others do. Although extreme information is less likely to fall within a latitude of acceptance, when it does so people may pass it along because it is more interesting or informative than other information. For example, in the domain of person perception, Skowronski and Carlston (1989) have argued that people find extreme behaviors to be more diagnostic when they are judging both morality and ability. In the domain of news, senior journalists teach young journalists that it is not news when "dog bites man," but it is news when "man bites dog." People spend more time attending to novel or extreme stimuli (McArthur & Ginzberg, 1981; Fiske, 1980) and work harder to explain them (Hil-ton & Slugoski, 1986) . People may also be disproportionately likely to pass along extreme news because they may assume that moderate information is already widely shared. Gricean norms of conversation encourage people to pass along only the quantity of information that is necessary and thus to avoid passing along redundant information (Grice, 1975) . There are also two opposite hypotheses about the valence of information: that people will prefer to pass along good news or that they will prefer to pass along bad news (again see Fig. 1 ). (Here I consider simple hypotheses about main effects. Later in the paper I will develop a more complex hypothesis.)
In order to achieve a pure test of the effect ofvalence of news, it is important to equate good and bad news on believability. For example, bad news may be inherently more plausible than good news when discussing the number of children who are abducted each year. Fiske and Taylor (1991) note that since "most people are optimists, negative stimuli are relatively unexpected and thus salient" (p. 249). The current paper attempts to avoid this kind of problem by using an experimental procedure to develop good and bad news figures that are equally unexpected. The hypotheses below, therefore, consider whether people will prefer to transmit good or bad news holding believability constant.
The first hypothesis posits that people will transmit good news more readily than bad news. Consistent with the work on positive illusions cited above (Taylor & Brown, 1988) , this hypothesis assumes that people prefer to that people will prefer to believe and transmit facts that paint the world in a positive light and that make them feel better and more optimistic about the world. For example, people like to believe the world is controllable (Langer, 1975) and just (Lerner, 1970) . If people prefer to believe that good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people, then people should transmit bad news only when it is not relevant for themselves.
People may also transmit good news more than they transmit bad news, not because they prefer good news but because they prefer to avoid bad news. Work by Tesser and Rosen (1976) on the "mum effect" indicates that people avoid passing along news that might negatively affect the self-concept of the receiver. For example, studies indicated that people avoided telling another person that he or she performed poorly on a test. Because Tesser and Rosen's experiments concerned news that was highly relevant to the self-concept of the receiver, it is difficult to extrapolate their findings to news that is not self-concept relevant.
3 However, to the 3 The current experiments will ask undergraduates what kinds of news they would pass along about the crime rate in their neighborextent that people wish to avoid being associated with the negative feelings that might accompany bad news, they might pass along good news only. Folk wisdom indicates that it is often hazardous to be the bearer of bad news. The opposite hypothesis is also possible. People may transmit bad news more readily than good news. Although this hypothesis is not easily derived from the psychological literature, it seems to be implicit in many discussions of the popular media. As indicated by the epigraphs, the anecdotal evidence of exaggeration tends to be in the direction of bad news rather than good news. More generally, people lament the large portion of newscasts devoted to murders, fires, and airline crashes, but then they rationalize the behavior of the media by assuming that "bad news sells." Bad news might transmit more effectively because it helps people prepare for the future better than good news. If it is "better to be safe than sorry," then bad news may be transmitted-even if it paints an overly negative picture of the world-because it allows people to anticipate and avoid an occasional bad outcome.
To summarize, we can imagine alternative hypotheses about both valence and extremity of news. Because opposite hypotheses can be constructed, the results of the experiments below hold some interest however they turn out. However, if we had to choose among the hypotheses at this point, the majority of theoretical arguments seem to predict that people will transmit central over extreme information and good news over bad news.
STUDY 1
The study below examines people's intentions to transmit good news and bad news in a domain of special relevance. The University of Chicago, like other universities in large cities, is known for being in a "bad neighborhood," and crime is a frequent topic of conversation among university residents. This study asks University of Chicago undergraduates whether they would pass along different kinds of news about muggings in the university neighborhood (Hyde Park).
In developing the materials for the study, I wanted to equate good and bad news for surprisingness. I did this by asking a preliminary sample from the study population to create confidence intervals for various quantities (e.g., the number of muggings in Hyde Park each year, the percentage that involve a handgun, the hood or the average starting salaries of graduates from thesr university. This information is self-relevant but it does not directly affect the self-concept or self-esteem of the receiver (or sender).
number of on-campus students mugged per 100 offcampus students). This procedure has been widely used in the decision making literature to solicit people's estimates ofnumeric quantities (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1981) .
After collecting the confidence intervals, I varied extremity by choosing figures that fell outside the confidence intervals of a certain percentage of the population. This procedure was used to equate the extremity of good news and bad news. For example, students at the University of Chicago would be pleasantly surprised to hear that only 15% of muggings involve a handgun and equally unpleasantly surprised to hear that 45% of muggings involve a handgun. These figures fell outside the 80% confidence intervals of 50% of our sample. Figures can also be created that are even more extreme. People would be very pleasantly surprised to hear that only 2% of muggings involve a handgun, they would be very unpleasantly surprised to hear that 90% of muggings involve a handgun. These figures fell outside the 80% confidence intervals of 90% of our sample.
Thus this procedure allowed me, in a domain that is very relevant and important to my participants, to examine whether people passed along pieces of bad news or good news that were equally plausible.
Method
This study surveyed 111 undergraduates who lived in on-campus dormitories at the University of Chicago. Participants were contacted in their dorms and received one dollar for completing the questionnaire which took approximately 10 mm. The questionnaire presented participants with information that would surprise them in either a positive or negative direction and then asked them how willing they would be to transmit that information in a future conversation.
Materials
Developing items of good and bad news. To develop the questionnaire for this study, I used the responses of a separate set of 52 participants, who completed a questionnaire that asked eight questions about muggings committed in the area around the University of Chicago (Hyde Park). Participants provided a best estimate and an 80% confidence interval for eight different quantities: the number of muggings each year, the percentage that involved a handgun, the percentage that resulted in serious injury, the average amount of money that was stolen, the number that involved males versus females, the number that on-campus students versus off-campus, the number that members of the University of Chicago community versus non-members, and the number that took place in Hyde Park versus Lincoln Park (a yuppie area on the northern side of the city). Instructions for this task are printed below:
The following questions concern muggings committed within the Hyde Park area. In the far left column give your best estimate of the following values. We realize that some of your estimates will be more uncertain than others. Therefore, we would like you to provide a low and a high bound to better describe your estimate. Give a low bound for each value so that you think there is only a 10% chance that the real value might be below the low bound you give. Then, give a high bound for each value so that you think there is only a 10% chance that the real value might be above the high bound you give.
Study 1 questionnaire.
Based on responses to the preliminary questionnaire, I created pieces of news that varied in their valence and extremity by selecting figures that would violate a certain proportion of participants' 80% confidence intervals on the low or high side. To surprise participants with either extremely good or bad news, I selected a value that violated 90% of the confidence intervals on the low or high side. For example, on the question about the number of muggings in Hyde Park each year, the good news value was 10 and the bad news value was 1100. To present participants with moderately good or bad news, I selected a value that violated 50% of the confidence intervals on the low or high side. The moderate good news value for the question about number of muggings was 100 and the moderate bad news value was 200. Table  1 contains the complete set of values used for each topic.
Using the four values derived from the preliminary questionnaire, I reworded each of the eight original questions as four different statements. For the question on the number of muggings, the four statements were created by taking the statement, "There were _______ muggings in Hyde Park last year," and replacing the blank with each of the four figures derived from the original questionnaires (10, 100, 200, 1100) . Each of Imagine that you are talking to an acquaintance and that the subject of muggings comes up. As you look at each of the following statements, assume that you heard the statement offered as true by another acquaintance in a conversation a couple ofweeks ago. Indicate on the scale after each statement how likely you would be to pass along this statement (as true) in the current conversation.
Participants responded on a 7-point scale anchored at "Unlikely to pass this along" and "Likely to pass this along."
Results
Responses on each topic were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with four levels corresponding to the four levels of valence: very bad, moderately bad, moderately good, and very good news. To analyze the two hypotheses, I report the results of contrasts designed to detect whether there was a linear and a quadratic trend in responses across the four levels. The linear contrast was -1, -1, + 1, + 1. The quadratic contrast was -1, + 1, + 1, -1. The quadratic contrast would be positive if people preferred to pass along central rather than extreme news. Because these two contrasts are orthogonal, the tests of the linear and quadratic components were independent. Table 2 reports the means for each category and the value and significance of the quadratic and linear contrasts. The results supported the centrality hypothesis, that people were more likely to transmit central rather than extreme news. Five of the eight quadratic contrasts were significantly positive, and the average quadratic contrast was positive (M = 1.38, t(7) = -3.45, P < .05). The results also supported the hypothesis that people were more likely to transmit bad news than good news; five of the eight linear contrasts were negative (at less than P < .00 1). Across the eight problems, the average linear contrast was significantly negative (M -1.62, t(7) = -3.37, P < .05).
Discussion
The results of the study support the centrality hypothesis, that people prefer to pass along less surprising rather than more surprising information. As indicated in the theory section, this result probably occurs because people regard the more extreme information as less believable.
This study also supports a preference for bad news over good news. This preference for bad news occurs despite the fact that both good and bad news were equally extreme and thus equally (un)believable. In general, when discussing negative domains like muggings, people may transmit bad news because the negative topic makes it easier to believe a given piece ofbad news than a given piece of good news. The design ofthis study eliminates any asymmetry in the believability of good and bad news.
The preference for bad news is particularly interesting because it seems to contradict results in social psychology that indicate that people like to believe that the world is good (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and controllable (Langer, 1975) . In this study, people seem quite willing to pass along information that paints the world as bad and uncontrollable. Participants are much more likely to pass along the bad news that "65% of mugging victims are seriously injured" than the equally surprising good news that only "1% of mugging victims are seriously injured."
The preference for transmitting bad news occurs despite the fact that participants are dealing with a domain that is quite important and relevant. I initially chose the subject of muggings because it was a frequent subject of conversation among Hyde Park residents, and thus appeared to be highly relevant for our participants. However, participants make it even more relevant for themselves by the bad news they choose to transmit. Participants are quite likely to pass along information that paints a negative picture of the mugging propensity of people like themselves (i.e., university students who live on campus). For example, they are more likely to pass along the bad news that muggings are "twice as likely" for University of Chicago people versus non-university people than the equally surprising good news that "muggings are one-tenth as likely."
In many situations, by passing along negative information, people may learn something that allows them to increase their control (e.g., by being more careful to avoid high crime areas). However, this does not completely explain the pattern of results in the current study. The questions that show the largest effects concern characteristics that are stable and uncontrollable at least in the short run-participants cannot easily change their housing (on versus off-campus), neighborhood (Hyde Park versus Lincoln Park), or community membership (University of Chicago versus non-University), much less their sex. Researchers have argued that stable, uncontrollable attributions for negative events are more likely to hopelessness or anxiety (Weiner, 1986) . The news people prefer to transmit would seem to exacerbate this reaction.
STUDY 2
Study 1 demonstrated that participants preferred to pass along bad news over good news and also preferred moderate over extreme news. However, Study l's figures for "moderately good news" and "moderately bad news~~were themselves fairly extreme since they fell outside 50% of participants' 80% confidence intervals. Study 2 tests how participants respond to truly moderate news by assessing how likely they are to transmit a figure that falls in the middle of the distribution of best guesses.
Study 2 also attempts to replicate the first study using a within-subjects design. In Study 1, people only considered one piece of news on a particular topic. Although this is probably the way that people receive information in real-world contexts, Study 2 explores the strength of the preference for bad news by highlighting the comparison between good and bad news. The within-subjects design provides each participant with both bad and good news. Thus it provides a more stringent format for testing the relative preference for bad news.
Method and Materials
Participants were 32 undergraduates at the University of Chicago who were contacted in their dorms, and paid $2 for their participation. Participants responded to three versions of the questions used in Study 1. The first page ofthe survey contained moderate values (derived by taking the median of the best guess responses on the pre-survey). The other two pages contained values that violated 75% of the confidence intervals on either the good side or the bad side. These pages were counterbalanced. Table 3 reports the stimuli used in this study. Participants responded using the same scale as in Study 1 ("Likely to pass this along" to "Unlikely pass this along").
Analysis
To analyze the two hypotheses, I compute a scale that indicates whether there was a linear and a quadratic trend in participant's willingness to pass along news in the three categories: bad, moderate, and good. The linear scale was computed by multiplying a participant's responses in the three categories by the values -1, 0, +1, and then summing. The quadratic scale was computed by multiplying responses by the values -1, +2, -1, and then summing. The linear score is positive if people preferred to pass along good news over bad news, and the quadratic score is positive if people preferred to pass along central rather than extreme news. Table 4 reports the average transmission propensity along with the linear and quadratic scale scores. For each question, paired t tests compared the linear and quadratic scale averages to zero. For the linear scales, five of the eight scales were individually significant in the predicted direction, one was significant in the opposite direction, and two were nonsignificant. For the quadratic scales, three of the eight scales were significant in the predicted direction.
To provide an overall test, we can analyze these scales for each participant across problems. Averaging across the 9 problems for each participant, 20/32 participants showed strictly positive linear scales in the majority of the problems (mean percentage of consistent scores = .576, t(31) = 2.69, P < .02, for a paired t test relative to .50).
The results for the quadratic contrast showed a weaker preference for central over extreme information. Participants' scores on the quadratic scales were more likely to be positive (mean percentage = .493) than negative (mean percentage = .403; t(31) = -2.10, P < .05), however, people did not show positive quadratic scales in the majority of problems. On an individual participant level, 12/32 participants had strictly positive quadratic scales in the majority of the problems, and 24/32 had either positive or zero scales in the majority of the problems.
Discussion
Compared with the first study, Study 2 does not show as extreme a preference for central over extreme information. The two studies differed on the extremity of the good and bad news items as well as the format of the within-subjects design, so it is impossible to say exactly what accounts for the weaker results on centrality. Study 3 allows another opportunity to explore both preferences in the within-subjects paradigm.
However, because it is a within-subjects design, Study 2 provides even stronger evidence than Study 1 that people prefer to transmit bad news about muggings. The within-subjects design allowed good news to compete directly with equally surprising bad news. Participants consistently opted to transmit the bad news, and the preference for bad news was sometimes quite pronounced. For example, students were as likely to pass along the bad news that half of mugging victims are seriously injured (a fact that violated a majority of the population's 80% confidence intervals on the bad news side) than the nonextreme news that 1 in 5 is injured (the median of the population's best guesses).
STUDY 3
Studies 1 and 2 indicate that people in at least some conditions prefer to transmit extreme negative over extreme positive information. However, the topic of muggings differs in at least two important ways from other potential topics of conversation. First, the topic is extremely relevant and self-involving. Because crime is a frequent topic of conversation among Hyde Park residents, when our participants imagine a conversation on the topic of muggings, they are high-involvement participants and can imagine talking with other highinvolvement participants. Would people show a similar pattern if a conversation involved a topic that was less self-relevant? Second, the topic of "muggings" is emotionally negative. Although the evidence thus far indicates that people prefer to pass along bad news, it is possible that this is true only because the conversational domain we have examined is one where bad news is pertinent and expected. If people pass along information that matches the emotional tone or content of conversation, then the pattern we observed in Studies 1 and 2 might be reversed if the topic was positive. When discussing topics, like mugging, that are emotionally negative peo-
The congruenec hypothesis

Bad news domain
Bad news ple may prefer to pass along bad news, but when discussing topics, like successful organ transplants or graduate school acceptances, that are emotionally positive and center around good news, they may prefer to pass along good news. This hypothesis, the congruence hypothesis, is depicted in Fig. 2 . Study 3 will expand the results of Studies 1 and 2 by manipulating the emotional content of topics (positive or negative) and the relevance (relevant or nonself-relevant). It also expands the first two studies by developing the stimuli individually for each participant. Although Studies 1 and 2 equate the extremity of good and bad news on average, any particular participant may have beliefs on a particular topic that differ from the participants we used to norm the stimuli. To make comparisons more precise, this study used a twostage methodology-first, participants gave individual confidence intervals, then a few weeks later, they indicated how likely they were to pass along values that were based on their own initial confidence intervals. Thus, the procedure in this study allowed us to be very precise in equating the believability of good and bad news.
Method
Participants were 25 undergraduates at the University of Chicago who were recruited in their dorm and paid for their participation. The study had two parts.
In the first survey, participants gave their best guess, a 50% confidence interval, and a 90% confidence interval for 20 numerical quantities. After they completed this task, participants rated the relevance and the valence of each topic. Relevance ratings were taken on 7-point scales anchored at "self-relevant" and "not self-relevant." Valence ratings were taken on 7-point scales anchored at "good" and "bad." There were two different valence ratings. The first asked participants to rate the valence of the topic: "Circle the number on the scale which shows how 'bad' or 'good' you think the topic of the question is. The second asked participants to rate the valence of the Good news expected conversational content that the topic would gendomain erate: "Circle a number on the scale below each question to signify whether conversation about this topic is most likely to generate good news or bad news." I used the first valence rating to develop stimuli. Later, I will use the second in a follow-up analysis.
Three weeks later, participants received the second survey. The second survey began with the same instructions used in previous studies: "Imagine that you Good news are talking to an acquaintance and that the following subjects come up. As you look at each of the following statements, assume you heard the statement offered as true by another acquaintance in a conversation a couple of weeks ago. Indicate on the scale after each statement how likely you would be to pass along this statement (as true) in the current conversation." Participants then saw 84 statements (70 were based on their own personal responses to the first survey and 14 were unrelated distracters). For each statement, they used a 7-point scale to rate how likely they would be to pass along this news in the conversation described (1 = unlikely to pass this along; 7 = likely to pass this along).
In order for the results to be meaningful, the confidence intervals must be stable over time. Therefore, 4 weeks after the second survey, 14 of the original participants were contacted again and asked to specify confidence intervals for 8 of the original 12 topics (to keep the survey under one page, I randomly selected two of the three topics from each cell of the 2 x 2 design).
Below, these results are analyzed to determine whether the confidence intervals are stable over time.
Materials
The goal for this study was to determine whether the relevance and valence of topics affects people's willingness to pass along certain pieces of information. As an initial attempt to ensure sufficient variation on these dimensions, 20 topics were chosen for the first survey that were expected to be high or low relevance and either positive or negative. For example, the "number of playgrounds in Hyde Park" was expected to be less relevant to the undergraduate participants than "number of U of C undergraduates that get financial aid each year," and both playgrounds and financial aid were expected to generate more positive news than "the number of bungee jumping fatalities in the United States this year" and "the length of the average wait for attention at the University Health clinic."
Using the actual ratings of relevance and valence that participants gave on the first survey, I chose the final topics for the second survey. The second survey Number of whooping cranes alive today (there were 15 left in 1941).
Number of playgrounds in Hyde park.
Number of successful organ transplants performed in the U.S. each year.
Bad
The average wait for attention at the University Health Service walk-inclinic. The number of U of C undergrads who have personal property stolen in a given year. According to the financial aid office, the expected tuition increase next year (in dollars).
The percentage of Native Americans that died directly or indirectly as a result of the European's colonization of the new world. Number of people killed by serial killers each year.
The number of bungee jumping fatalities this year.
had a 2 x 2 design (Good/Bad, Self-relevant/Not selfrelevant) with three items in each cell. Out of the 20 numerical quantities on the first survey, I selected three items for each cell based on a median split of the original ratings of relevance and valence of topic. Thus, a "good, not self-relevant" item had a score above the median on goodness and a score below the median on self-relevance. Table 5 contains the 12 topics and Table  6 contains the relevance and valence ratings for each topic.
In the first survey, participants made five estimates for each quantity: they gave their best guess and set high and low bounds for a 50% confidence interval and a 90% confidence interval. The second survey turned each ofthese five estimates into a statement. For example, on the question on serial killers, participants saw statements of the form" people are killed by serial killers each year." Participants saw this statement seven times. Five of the seven times, the blank was replaced by one of the five estimates they had given in the first survey; two times, the blank was replaced with a distracter that was not derived from their values. For each of the seven statements, participants indicated how likely they would be to pass along the statement.
Thus, the second survey consisted of 84 statements:
12 topics x 7 numerical estimates (5 from the first survey plus 2 distracters). The 84 items were randomly arranged on the survey, but the basic template of the survey was the same across participants (e.g., question five always contained a participant's best estimate for the whooping crane question).
Results
Stability ofconfidence intervals.
If confidence intervals change over time in any systematic way, then the results of the transmission survey will be hard to interpret. For example, for the test of good versus bad news, it is important that changes not be skewed systematically (e.g., that over time bad news figures not become more or less implausible than good news figures).
To determine how stable the confidence intervals were, I examined the confidence intervals reported by the subsample who gave confidence intervals at time one and time three. I used paired t tests to assess the direction and magnitude of changes across time for each of the five estimates provided for each topic (e.g., best guess, medium high bound, etc.). The results of this test showed no systematic changes in the confidence intervals for any of the eight topics. Only 5 of the 40 tests were significant at P < .10 (a result well within the realm of chance), and there was no systematic pattern to those 5 results. Thus, there seems to be no problem with interpreting the general analysis.
Analysis of pass-along responses. For each topic, the five pieces of news can be arrayed from bad to good: very bad, bad, moderate, good, and very good. Again, as in previous studies, to analyze the effects of valence and relevance, I computed a scale that indicates whether there was a linear and a quadratic trend in responses across the five categories. The linear scale was computed by multiplying a participant's response in the five categories by the values -1, -1, 0, ±1,+1, Note. All ratings taken on 7-point scale. For relevance ratings, 1 = self-relevant, 7 = not self-relevant. For valence ratings, 1 = good, 7 -bad. Wording of question for Valence-Topic ratings: "Circle the number on the scale which shows how 'bad' or 'good' you think the topic of the question is." Wording of question for Valence-Expected Content ratings: "Circle a number on the scale below each question to signif~' whether conversation about this topic is most likely to generate good news or bad news." and then summing. The quadratic scale was computed by multiplying responses by the values -1, -1, +4, -1, -1. Thus the linear score will be positive if people prefer to pass along good news over bad news, and the quadratic score will be positive if people prefer to pass along more central news rather than more extreme news. Table 7 reports mean willingness to transmit information for each piece of news as well as the linear and quadratic scales. For the linear scales, recall that the congruence hypothesis predicts positive means for the good items and negative means for the bad items. Paired t tests indicate that 4 out of the 12 items are individually significant in the predicted direction and no item differs significantly from zero in the opposite direction. People are more willing to transmit congruent than incongruent information, but the gap for the extreme figures (very good-very bad) is approximately the same as the gap for the more moderate figures (good-bad). Thus, contrasts that weight the extreme or the moderate figures more than the other do not produce a systematically better fit.
For the quadratic scales, paired t tests indicate that 7 out of the 12 figures are individually significant at P < .05. The results for the quadratic scale are driven by the difference between the middle point and all the others. The good and bad value are typically not significantly higher than the very good and very bad values (i.e., the contrast -1, -i-i, 0, -i-i, -1 is not significant).
This general pattern above is also found within each participant. Averaging across the 12 problems for each participant, 16/25 participants had linear scale scores that were consistent with the congruence hypothesis in the majority of the problems (mean percentage of consistent scores = .593, t(24) = 2.72, P < .02), and 21/ 25 had quadratic scores that were consistent with the centrality hypothesis in the majority of the problems (mean percentage of positive scores = .678, t(24) = 4.85, P < .001). Table 7 indicates that there is some pattern to the linear and quadratic scale scores across categories. However, it aggregates data across participants without controlling for individual opinions about the relevance and valence of the topics. To systematically integrate this information, I computed the regressions in Table 8 . This table contains two sets of regressions. Each set contains three regressions that predict different aspects of the transmission function: elevation (i.e., how likely people are to talk about the topic in general), linear shape (i.e., whether people are more likely to the topic of the question is." The second asked people pass along good or bad news), and quadratic shape (i.e., to evaluate the valence of the expected content of a conwhether people are more likely to pass along central versation about the topic: Indicate "whether conversa or extreme news). tion about this topic is most likely to generate good In the table, the two sets of regressions correspond news or bad news." The valence of the topic affects the to the two different measures of valence used in Study shape of transmission functions (see regressions on left 3. The first measure asked people to evaluate the va-side of Table 8 ), but the valence of expected content lence of the topic: Indicate "how 'bad' or 'good' you think does not (see regressions on right). Consider the regressions on the left of Table 8 . The first regression indicates that the elevation of the function is affected by relevance but not valence. People are more likely to discuss topics that are self-relevant. However, valence doesn't matter: Overall, people are equally willing to talk about topics that are emotionally positive or emotionally negative.
The second and third regressions show that the linear and quadratic shapes of the function are not affected by relevance, but they are affected by valence. Consider the quadratic regression in the third column. The negative coefficient on valence (standardized /3 = -.126, P < .05) indicates that the quadratic scale becomes less positive (i.e., that people show less preference for passing along the most central value) as the valence of the topic becomes more emotionally bad. Now consider the linear regression which allows us to test the congruence hypothesis. The negative coefficient on valence (standardized~3= -.2 12, P < .00 1) indicates that the linear scale becomes more negative as the valence of the topic becomes more emotionally "bad." This supports the congruence hypothesis that people prefer to pass along bad news for bad news topics and good news for good news topics. To provide a more direct illustration of the information in this regression, I sorted the linear scales based on their sign and the valence of the topic. (I omitted scales that were zero and topics that participants rated as emotionally neutral, i.e., a 4 on the 7-point scale.) When participants rated a domain as emotionally positive (N = 83), they were more likely to show positive linear scales (51/ 83 = .61) and when they rated a domain as emotionally negative (N = 130), they were more likely to show negative linear scales (77/130 = .59).
Note, however, that the three regressions on the right side of Table 8 do not show any effects for valence. This indicates that of the two ways of measuring valence, valence of topic (the regressions on the left) is more effective than valence of expected content (the regressions on the right).
Discussion
This study provides compelling evidence that people are not simply optimists or pessimists. Instead, they pass along information that is congruent with the valence of the topic. In emotionally positive domains people pass along good news and in emotionally negative domains they pass along bad news.
The different results for the two valence measures indicate that people passed along news that matched not the expected the content of the conversation, but the topic. To understand this point, look at Table 6 and consider the two different valence ratings for the topic, "wait time at health center." Participants rated the topic as emotionally negative (5.40), but they expected a conversation about this topic to generate reasonably good news (3.00). It is easy to understand why wait time is an emotionally negative topic. Students legitimately find it aversive to imagine themselves sitting in a waiting room, surrounded by others who are spreading germs that are more violent than those that caused their current illness. However, despite the painful or distressing nature of the topic, students do not think that the wait time is actually all that bad, thus they expect that the content of a conversation would center around shorter wait times. In this situation, if people strategically matched the valence of expected conversational content, they would pass along news about 5-or 10-mm waits. Instead, people seem to match their conversational contributions to the valence of the topic, and they pass along horror stories about waits of 45 mm or an hour-and-a-half.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These studies document a tendency to pass along central over extreme news. However, when extreme news arises, not all kinds of extremity are equally favored. In Studies 1 and 2 people were more willing to pass along bad news than equally believable good news. This inclination is particularly striking because it contradicts general tendencies to want to see the world as a stable, controllable place, where good things happen to good people (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Langer, 1975; Lerner, 1970) . People passed along bad news despite the fact that it was highly relevant and despite the fact that much of the bad news related to facts that were relatively uncontrollable (e.g., participants could not change their housing, neighborhood, or student status).
However, Study 3 shows that people do not display a simple preference for bad news. Instead, they pass along information that matches the emotional valence of the conversation topic. This leads people to pass along exaggeratedly bad news when the topic is emotionally negative, but to pass along exaggeratedly good news when the topic is emotionally positive.
Limitations of the Current Studies
Research on persuasion and attitude change indicates that there are a variety of situational variables that may influence what kinds of information people believe and pass along in different situations (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) . For example, people's willingness to pass along information will probably vary with the audience (close friends versus casual acquaintances), the credibility of the source (science reporter or gossip col-umnist), and the goal of the interaction (to entertain or to inform). Thus, when interpreting these results it is important to remember the scenario described in the current studies. People received information from an acquaintance and were asked whether they would pass it along "as true" to another acquaintance in a different conversation. I chose this scenario because I wanted to understand what kinds of distortions in news might arise in normal social interaction. Thus it was important that people have the goal of passing along truthful news and that they not receive the news from a source that was so highly credible that even extreme news would be believable. However, the preferences documented here may be limited to situations similar to the ones described in the scenario.
Although the current studies document a robust preference for certain kinds of news, they are also limited because they do not indicate why people demonstrate the preferences they do. The current studies answer questions at one level but they raise questions at another. In general, the questions of this paper can be addressed at three different levels. (1) What kinds of information are available in social systems? (2) What preferences do people show in the kind of news they transmit? (3) Why do people demonstrate the preferences they do? The current studies focus on the second level (what preferences people show), and this may allow us to make predictions about phenomena at the first level; for example, we can now predict that social interaction is likely to support the propagation of central news and congruent news. However, there is more to be learned about the third level ofindividual psychology. In explaining why individuals might prefer central news, the theory section argued that people would pass along central information for personal reasons (because they themselves would find it more believable) and for social reasons (because they would be less concerned about losing social credibility when they passed it along). However, the literature did not anticipate the congruence hypothesis, particularly the aspect of congruency that leads people to transmit bad news in emotionally bad domains. Thus, it is worth further study to understand why people demonstrate this preference. For example, why are people more likely to pass along news that supports the emotional tone of a conversation rather than the expected conversational content? Are people searching for rational reasons to support their emotional reactions in domains that produce hope or fear?
Finally, the current experimental designs are limited because they measure only intentions to transmit information and not actual transmission. Future work might attempt to examine the congruence hypothesis in a situation where people actually talk with others and choose whether to pass along a particular piece of information. Such studies must satisfy a number of constraints. They must introduce a piece ofinformation into the lab environment in a way that does not heighten a participant's suspicion about the purpose of the experiment but also does not prejudice the participant to think that the figure should be given more weight than it should (e.g., if people are given the information in printed form, this might convey undue credibility and decrease the extremity of the information). The current procedure was chosen because it seemed to provide a reasonably effective trade-off between volume of information and external validity. However, to interpret the results, we must assume that actual transmission is related monotonically to transmission intentions. Future results could eliminate the need for this assumption by examining actual transmission.
Potential Applications of the Current Results
The results of these studies provide interesting tools for speculating about the marketplace of ideas. In general, the evidence in favor of the centrality hypothesis indicates that truth may win out in many situations. In these studies, people often passed along the least surprising, most believable information that was available. However, to the extent that truth does not win out, errors in different directions are not equally likely. Based on the congruence hypothesis, for positive topics, the environment will support facts that are inappropriately Pollyanna-ish. For negative topics, the environment will support facts that are overly bleak.
The preference for congruent information may clarify what kinds of information may be available in various social interactions. For example, in a review of the literature on consumer satisfaction, Yi (1990) remarked that the empirical evidence on consumer word of mouth has been "mixed" (p. 109). She cites three different studies, one which found that satisfied customers talk more than dissatisfied customers, one which found dissatisfied customers talk more, and a third which found no difference. The congruence hypothesis points out that consumers may transmit different kinds of news depending on the emotional tone oftheir conversations. This preference for congruence may even lead consumers to show schizophrenic reactions toward a single product. If most products contain a mixture of good and bad features, then depending on the emotional tone of the interaction , in one conversation consumers may pass along information that exaggerates the product's benefits and in another they may pass along information that exaggerates its flaws.
In another domain, consider the content of gossip in organizations. Burt and Knez (1995) have a very interesting paper in which they examine a large organization to understand how social networks affect trust. They find that when a particular dyad trusts each other, the extent of their trust increases with the number of third party ties that link them together. This result in and ofitself is not surprising; the third parties provide a social audience for the dyad that may cause both members of the dyad to treat each other well because they know that others are watching their interaGtion. More interesting, then, is the fact that when the members of a dyad distrust each other, the extent of their distrust is also magnified by the number of third parties that link them together. Thus, third parties do not simply provide a social audience that reinforces trust; instead the third party ties amplify both trust and mistrust. Burt and Knez (1995) explain their data by assuming that when the third parties interact with one member of the dyad, they tend to strategically alter their reactions to the second member because they want to reinforce their relationship with the first. (For example, suppose Bob and Joe distrust each other, but Carl has good relationships with both of them. When Carl talks to Bob, he might downplay his positive regard for Joe because doesn't want Bob to question his loyalty.)
The congruence hypothesis predicts a similar pattern of distortions even if people do not strategically manage their interactions with the members of the dyads. According to the congruence hypothesis, when the conversation revolves around Joe's incompetence, people will vie to tell the best story about how badly Joe botched this month's report or last month's sales presentation. When the conversation revolves around Joe's generosity, people will vie to tell the best story about how warmly Joe dealt with the janitorial staff or a stranger on the street. Imagine, for example, that when the members of the dyad discuss each other with third parties, their trust or mistrust of each other sets the initial tone of their conversations. In this situation, the congruence hypothesis predicts that third parties are likely to pass along news that reinforces the dyad member's initial feelings. As more third parties surround the dyad, the members of the dyad engage in a larger number of conversations about each other, and they collect a larger sample of information that is biased by the third parties' preference for passing along congruent news. Thus, when the dyad encounters a greater number of third party conversation partners, they also collect more information that may amplify their initial trust or mistrust.
In a final example, we can use the preference for congruence news to predict the content of social interaction in an even broader social system. During World War II a patriotic application of social science was to design "rumor clinics" to document and fight the rumors that inevitably arise during times of turmoil. A classic taxonomy (Knapp, 1944) divided rumors into three categories. The first category was wedge-drivers, which were rumors that disparaged a particular social group. For example one rumor held that American Catholics were trying to avoid the draft, and a whole class of rumors claimed that various kinds of public workers were using their positions to acquire personal supplies of rationed goods.
The second and third types of rumors were labeled bogies and pipe-dreams. Bogies were rumors about looming threats or traumatic events, e.g., "The entire Pacific Fleet was destroyed at Pearl Harbor" (Rostow & Fine, 1976, p. 23) . Pipe dreams were rumors about positive events. During the liberation of France in WWII, for example, consistent rumors placed the Allied forces in the "next town over.
This classification of the distortions of wartime rumors bears a striking resemblance to the pattern predicted by the congruence hypothesis. When considering the contrast between "pipe dreams" and "bogies," someone might reasonably attribute these contrasting distortions to separate crowds of optimists and pessimists, each crowd passing along information that matches its preferred picture of the world. The results on the congruence hypothesis indicate that these tendenciestoward unwarranted optimism on the one hand and unwarranted pessimism on the other-might arise because single individuals prefer to transmit information that matches the emotional tone of the topic.
